

Farewell to Direct Source Incompatibilism*

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Traditional theorists about free will and moral responsibility endorse the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise. According to source theorists, PAP is false and an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she is the source of that action. Source incompatibilists accept the source theory but also endorse INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible for any action. This paper is a critique of a kind of source incompatibilism, namely, direct source incompatibilism.

Direct source incompatibilists reject PAP on the basis of Frankfurt-style examples. Since PAP is one of two premises in the traditional argument for INC, direct source incompatibilists opt for a version of the direct argument, which argues for INC with the aid of some non-responsibility transfer principle. I demonstrate that this option is not available, for there is a tension between the following two claims.

SI-F: There are genuine Frankfurt-style examples.

SI-D: There is a sound version of the direct argument.

More specifically, (a) Frankfurt-style examples provide the impetus for at least one group of counterexamples to non-responsibility transfer principles, and (b) non-responsibility transfer principles may be used to show that crucial agents—those purported to be responsible in Frankfurt-style examples—are not morally responsible for their actions.

Keywords: free will, moral responsibility, incompatibilism, source theory, Frankfurt-style examples, alternative possibilities, direct argument.

1. Introduction

The free will thesis is the view that some of our actions are up to us. As I use the expression, ‘free will’ designates the “freedom-relevant condition” that is necessary for moral responsibility (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1993, 8). Thus, a person is

morally responsible for performing an action only if it is or was up to her. Most philosophers can accept these claims yet there is significant debate about the nature of free will and about what it means to say that some things are up to us.¹

First, there is the longstanding dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Compatibilists believe that the free will thesis is consistent with the thesis of determinism whereas incompatibilists deny this. A related thesis is INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible for any action. Given the assumptions above, if one is an incompatibilist, then one also accepts INC.

Traditional theorists hold that an action is up to a person only if she can do or could have done otherwise. They endorse the principle of alternative possibilities.

PAP: a person is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise.

Source theorists reject PAP and believe that an action is up to a person only if she is the source of the action. Those who accept PAP yet think that sourcehood is essential to free will (van Inwagen 1983; Ginet 1990; Kane 1996) are regarded as traditional theorists.²

This essay is a critique of one kind of source incompatibilism: direct source incompatibilism.³ There are two main features of this view. First, the direct source incompatibilist rejects PAP on the basis of Frankfurt-style examples. Second, she supports INC with a version of the direct argument. In the remainder of this section, I explain these features in more detail.

In his original essay, Harry Frankfurt offers this example in an effort to undermine PAP:

Suppose someone—Black, let us say—wants Jones₄ to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones₄ is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones₄ is going to decide to do something *other* than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones₄ is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones₄ decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do. Whatever Jones₄'s initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will have his way (1969, 162).

Suppose that Black (the *intervener*) wants Jones₄ (the *crucial agent*) to rob a bank, and that Jones₄ robs the bank without the need of Black's intervention. Direct source incompatibilists believe that Jones₄ is morally responsible for robbing the bank but that he could not have done otherwise. Thus, they believe that there are genuine Frankfurt-style examples, e.g., Frankfurt-style examples that are counterexamples to PAP.

PAP is one of two premises in the traditional argument for INC (cf. Widerker 2002, 316).⁴

IVD: If determinism is true, then no one could have done otherwise.

PAP: If no one could have done otherwise, then no one is morally responsible.

INC: Thus, if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible.

Since source compatibilists reject INC, the denial of PAP is unproblematic. However the rejection of PAP poses a minor problem for source incompatibilists. If they wish to support INC with a line of reasoning it must be different than the traditional argument.

The direct source incompatibilist meets this challenge by putting forth a version of the direct argument, that is, an argument in support of INC that requires a non-responsibility transfer principle (Widerker 2002; see § 3 below for more detail). It follows that the direct source incompatibilist accepts two theses.

SI-F: There are genuine Frankfurt-style examples.

SI-D: There is a sound version of the direct argument.

I show that there is a conflict between SI-F and SI-D, so direct source incompatibilism is an untenable position.

My criticism gets its impetus from two lines of research by David Widerker. In one set of papers (1995a, 1995b, and 2000), Widerker argues that Frankfurt-style examples do not pose a serious threat to the traditional libertarian, casting doubt on SI-F (§ 2).⁵ In another work, Widerker (2002) disputes SI-D by offering counterexamples to a variety of non-responsibility transfer principles. Some of these counterexamples are modeled after Frankfurt-style examples (§ 3), suggesting one well-known tension between SI-F and SI-D (Fischer 1986b and 2004, 189; Ravizza 1994). In this paper, I expose another tension: assuming that these transfer principles are valid it follows that crucial agents in Frankfurt-style examples are not morally responsible for their actions (§§ 4–5). My conclusion is weaker than the conclusions of Widerker and others. For I allow that there might be genuine Frankfurt-style examples or that there might be sound versions of the direct argument. Nonetheless, SI-F is at odds with SI-D, so direct source incompatibilism is inherently unstable.

2. The Widerker/Kane/Ginet Dilemma

Widerker's criticisms of Frankfurt-style examples may be formulated in terms of a dilemma: the Widerker/Kane/Ginet (WKG) dilemma (Widerker 1995a, 1995b, and 2000; Kane 1996; Ginet 1996; see also Fischer 1999, 99–100; Pereboom 2000, 112–114).

- In any Frankfurt-style example, either determinism is true or it is not.
- If determinism is true, then one may reject the claim that the crucial agent in the example is morally responsible for performing the action.
- If determinism is not true, then one may reject the claim that the crucial agent in the example could not have done otherwise.
- Therefore, there are no genuine Frankfurt-style examples.

Recall that in any genuine Frankfurt-style example, the crucial agent is morally responsible for her action even though she could not have done otherwise.

In response to the second horn of the WKG dilemma, a number of new Frankfurt-style examples have been developed.⁶ Frankfurt's original example involved a 'prior sign' signaling that an alternative action was imminent and the intervener was able to thwart the alternative action by 'preemption.' Some of the new Frankfurt-style examples alter this situation by supposing that the intervener 'blocks' or 'interrupts' the alternative action instead (Stump 1996, 1999, and 2003). I won't review the details of these or other examples since several philosophers have already done so (Fischer 1999; Widerker 2000; Pereboom 2000).

Instead, I focus on the general features of genuine Frankfurt-style examples, illustrated by what I take to be the best example: Tax Evasion (2).⁷

Joe is considering whether to claim a tax deduction for the substantial local registration fee that he paid when he bought a house. He knows that claiming the deduction is illegal, that he probably won't be caught, and that if he is, he can convincingly plead ignorance. Suppose he has a very powerful but not always overriding desire to advance his self-interest regardless of the cost to others, and no matter whether advancing his self-interest involves illegal activity. Crucially, his psychology is such that the only way that in this situation he could fail to choose to evade taxes is for moral reasons. (The phrase *failing to choose to evade taxes* is meant to encompass not choosing to evade taxes and choosing not to evade taxes.) His psychology is not, for example, such that he could fail to choose to evade taxes for no reason or simply on a whim. In addition, it is causally necessary for his failing to choose to evade taxes in this situation that he attain a certain level of attentiveness to these moral reasons. He can secure this level of attentiveness voluntarily. However, his attaining this level of attentiveness is not causally sufficient for his failing to choose to evade taxes. If a moral reason were to occur to him with that force, Joe could, with his libertarian free will, either choose to act on it or refrain from doing so (without the intervener's device in place). But to ensure that he choose to evade taxes, a neuroscientist now implants a device which, were it to sense a moral reason occurring with the specified force, would electronically stimulate his brain so that he would choose to evade taxes. In actual fact, he does not attain this level of attentiveness, and he chooses to evade taxes while the device remains idle (Pereboom 2003, 193).

According to Pereboom, Tax Evasion (2) effectively sidesteps the WKG dilemma, for "the cue for intervention"—Joe's level of attentiveness to his moral reasons—is "a *necessary* rather than a sufficient condition, not for the action that the agent actually performs, but *for the agent's availing herself of any robust alternative possibility*" (2003, 193; his emphasis throughout). Given the circumstances, Joe must evade taxes but his tax evasion is apparently not causally determined by prior events.

One can dispute Pereboom's claim that Joe's act is not causally determined. Peter van Inwagen defines 'determinism' as the conjunction of two theses:

- For every instant of time, there is a proposition that expresses the state of the world at that instant;
- If *p* and *q* are any propositions that express the state of the world at some instants, then the conjunction of *p* with the laws of nature entails *q* (1983, 65).

Pereboom might argue that, in Tax Evasion (2), there is a time t and a moral reason r such that it is possible that r occurs to Joe with a specified force at t and it is also possible that r does not occur to Joe with a specified force at t . Thus, there is a time prior to t such that the proposition describing the state of the world at that time conjoined with the laws of nature *does not* entail the proposition describing the state of the world at t . Hence, Tax Evasion (2) does not describe a situation that is *globally* deterministic, one in which every event is causally determined.

Nonetheless, it might be that Joe's tax evasion is *locally deterministic*. According to Widerker, "an event is causally determined iff there obtains prior to its occurrence a causally sufficient condition for it" (1995a, 115). Pereboom claims that Joe's level of attentiveness to his moral reasons is a necessary but not sufficient condition for his evading taxes. However, this is consistent with there being some other set of causally sufficient conditions for Joe's action. If there is such a set of conditions, then Joe's action is causally determined; if there is not, then there is no reason to think that Joe could not have done otherwise. Therefore, the WKG dilemma remains a threat. For the purposes of this paper, though, I presume that SI-F is true and try to show that problems still arise for direct source incompatibilism.

3. The Direct Argument and Widerker's Criticisms

Given SI-F, the direct source incompatibilist is halfway toward motivating her position. In order to complete the journey, she must provide a sound argument for INC, since genuine Frankfurt-style examples like Tax Evasion (2) provide counterexamples to PAP and, thus, a reason to reject the traditional argument. Enter the direct argument. Note that I am not suggesting that the direct argument is the source incompatibilist's only option but by definition it is the choice of the direct source incompatibilist.

Let me begin—as Widerker does—with a basic version of the direct argument, offered by van Inwagen (1980). This argument utilizes two principles:

- (A') From (p) deduce $NR(p)$;
- (B') From $NR(p)$ and $NR(p \supset q)$ deduce $NR(q)$,

where ' (p) ' stands for ' p is broadly logically necessary,' ' \supset ' represents the material conditional, and ' $NR(p)$ ' stands for " p and no one is (now), or ever has been, morally responsible for the fact that p " (Widerker 2002, 317; cf. van Inwagen 1983, 184). (B') is a non-responsibility transfer principle.

In this essay, I use Widerker's NR-operator instead of van Inwagen's N-operator, where ' Np ' stands for ' p and no one is, or ever has been, even partly responsible for the fact that p .' In place of (B'), van Inwagen endorses:

- (B) From $N(p)$ and $N(p \supset q)$ deduce $N(q)$.

One reason for choosing the NR-operator is exegetical, for I am discussing Widerker's criticisms of the direct argument. Furthermore, as Widerker notes, "van Inwagen's use of 'even' in his formulation of $NR(p)$. . . strongly suggests that he wishes the direct argument to hold not only for the notion of partial responsibility but also for the notion of responsibility itself" (2002, fn. 11).

Of course, there are important differences between the concepts of *responsibility* and *partial responsibility* and these differences are crucial to questions about the validity of many of the transfer principles discussed in this paper. Indeed, Widerker is aware that some of his counterexamples to (B') are not counterexamples to (B) (2002, fn. 11). Since my main argument (§§ 4–5) assumes the validity of these transfer principles, the differences between the operators are less important than they might be otherwise.

For a version of the direct argument, let P_0 be a proposition about the state of the world at some time in the remote past—a time prior to the birth of any human beings—and let L be the conjunction of laws of nature. If determinism is true, then $((P_0 \ \& \ L) \supset P)$, for any true proposition P . From (A') it follows that no one is (now), or ever has been, morally responsible for the fact that $(P_0 \ \& \ L) \supset P$. But no one is (now), or ever has been, morally responsible for the fact that that $P_0 \ \& \ L$. Therefore, from principle (B') it follows that no one is (now), or ever has been, morally responsible for the fact that that P , for any true proposition P .⁸

Widerker (2002) offers persuasive counterexamples to various transfer principles. These counterexamples are of two kinds. One set mimics Frankfurt-style examples except for an important difference. Recall that in Frankfurt's original example there are two agents: the crucial agent and the intervener. In Widerker's first set of counterexamples to (B'), there is only one agent and a natural process takes the place of the intervener. Call such examples, 'single-agent Frankfurt-style examples.'

Consider Erosion (Ravizza 1994), a counterexample to (B') discussed by Widerker (2002, 318) and, in even more detail, by Fischer (1994; 1999; 2004).

Imagine that Betty plants her explosives in the crevices of a glacier and detonates the charge at T_1 , causing an avalanche that crushes the enemy fortress at T_3 . Unbeknownst to Betty and her commanding officers, however, the glacier is gradually melting, shifting, and eroding. Had Betty not placed the dynamite in the crevices, some ice and rocks would have broken free at T_2 , starting a natural avalanche that would have crushed the enemy camp at T_3 (Ravizza 1994, 72–73).

Given Erosion we have the following argument.

- $NR(\text{the glacier is eroding})$
- $NR(\text{the glacier is eroding} \supset \text{there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy's base at } T_3)$
- Therefore, $NR(\text{there is an avalanche that crushes the enemy's base at } T_3)$

(B') is invalid, for the premises of the above argument are true yet the conclusion is false. Thus, single-agent Frankfurt-style examples undermine some of the transfer principles used in versions of the direct argument.

However, single-agent Frankfurt-style examples do not undermine all of the transfer principles used in versions of the direct argument. The proponent need only strengthen (B') (Widerker 2002, 319):

(B₁) From NR(p) and (p entails q) deduce NR(q) (Warfield 1996).

(B₁) is immune to single-agent Frankfurt-style examples, so Widerker turns to other examples. In order to characterize these, recall van Inwagen's original principle:

(B') From NR(p) and NR($p \supset q$) deduce NR(q).

What is distinctive about this second set of counterexamples is that in each the event that makes it the case that p occurs after the event that makes it the case that q . Nonetheless, q is a necessary condition for p . This alters the order in standard cases of causal determinism. Call these examples 'altered chronology examples.'⁹

Hud Hudson offers an altered chronology example that is a counterexample to van Inwagen's (B).¹⁰ I've changed it to provide a counterexample (B₁). Call it 'Bolt.'

One day Sparky is born to two loving parents. Many years later, a bolt of lightning strikes Sparky and he dies soon after.

Now consider the following argument:

- NR(a bolt from the blue strikes Sparky)
- That a bolt from the blue strikes Sparky entails that Sparky exists.
- Therefore, NR(Sparky exists)

Sparky's parents were responsible for the fact that he exists. Hence, the above argument has true premises and a false conclusion and (B₁) is invalid.

The proponent of the direct argument may respond by constructing yet another non-responsibility transfer principle, for instance:

(B₂) From NR(p) and NR($p \supset q$) deduce NR(q), where q describes an event or state of affairs that occurs later than that described by p (Ginet 2002; Widerker 2002, 322 fn. 14).

Widerker acknowledges that one might construct transfer principles like (B₂) to avoid altered chronology examples (2002, 322–323). He argues, however, that these new principles depend for their "plausibility on the assumption (IVD) of the incompatibility of determinism with the freedom to avoid acting as one did" (323). Thus, he claims that even if there are sound versions of the direct argument, they eventually rest on principles essential to the traditional argument.

I won't review the details of Widerker's reasoning here, though they are compelling. Rather, I circumvent his strategy by assuming that each of principles (B'),

(B₁), and (B₂) is valid. I argue that, given the validity of these principles, it follows that crucial agents in Frankfurt-style examples are not morally responsible for their actions.

4. Non-Responsibility Transfer Principles and Frankfurt-style Examples

Recent surveys (Fischer 1999 and Pereboom 2000) suggest that genuine Frankfurt-style examples must satisfy three conditions (where *S* is the crucial agent of the example and *a* is his supposed morally responsible action):

- (1) *a* is the result of one of two possible causal chains: *c*₁ (the actual, indeterministic causal chain) or *c*₂ (the counterfactual causal chain),
- (2) *a* is the actual result of *c*₁ and is thus the actual result of processes that are ultimately indeterministic, and
- (3) *a* is up to *S*.¹¹

In Tax Evasion (2), for instance, *S* is Joe, *a* is Joe's act of tax evasion, *c*₁ is the actual causal chain leading to Joe's action, and *c*₂ is the counterfactual causal chain that would have resulted had the neuroscientist's device sensed a moral reason with the specified force. Proponents of new Frankfurt-style examples believe that (1) ensures that *S* could not have done otherwise, (2) ensures that *a* was not causally determined, and (3) suggests that *S* is morally responsible for doing *a*.

To begin, consider an agent-relative variant of transfer principle (B') (cf. Fischer 1994, 8):

(B*) From NR_S(*p*) and NR_S(*p* ⊃ *q*) deduce NR_S(*q*),

where 'NR_S(*p*)' means '*p* and *S* is not (now) and never was morally responsible for the fact that *p*.' Assuming conditions (1)–(3), one may demonstrate that if (B*) is valid, then crucial agents in Frankfurt-style examples are not morally responsible for their actions. Given (1)–(3), the crucial agent *S* in a genuine Frankfurt-style example *is* morally responsible for *a* even though she could not have done otherwise. In such examples, *a* is the result of one of two possible causal chains: *c*₁ (the actual, indeterministic chain that has its source in *S*) or *c*₂ (the counterfactual chain). Let *C*₁ be the proposition that the events in *c*₁ occur and result in *S* doing *a*, let *C*₂ be the proposition that the events in *c*₂ occur and result in *S* doing *a*, and let *A* be the proposition that *S* does *a*.

In any genuine Frankfurt-style example, (*C*₁ ∨ *C*₂) entails *A*, for *S*'s doing *a* is part of the content of both *C*₁ and *C*₂. Given principle (A'), it follows that no one is (now), or ever has been, morally responsible for the fact that (*C*₁ ∨ *C*₂) ⊃ *A*. In particular, *S* is not responsible and NR_S((*C*₁ ∨ *C*₂) ⊃ *A*). But *S* is not (now) and

never was morally responsible for the fact that $C_1 \vee C_2$. This fact was ensured by the intervener, for he made it the case that $C_1 \vee C_2$ well before S made it the case that C_1 .¹² From (B*) it follows that S is not (now) and never was morally responsible for the fact that A . The argument is perfectly general, so we can conclude that if (B*) is valid, then crucial agents in Frankfurt-style examples are not morally responsible for their actions.

The source incompatibilist will likely disagree with my claim that the crucial agent is not (now) and never was morally responsible for the fact that $C_1 \vee C_2$. One might argue that the crucial agent is morally responsible for the fact that $C_1 \vee C_2$ since she is morally responsible for the fact that C_1 , and $C_1 \vee C_2$ is entailed by C_1 . But if this argument is sound, one may similarly argue that the crucial agent is morally responsible for the fact that $C_1 \vee \sim C_1$, which is false according to principle (A'). Thus, this response is not available to the proponent of the direct argument.

There is no substantive reason for accepting principle (B') and denying its agent-relative counterpart, (B*) (cf. van Inwagen 1989, 408–409). Moreover, it seems that for any genuine Frankfurt-style example there is a single-agent counterpart. One might, for instance, argue that Betty in Erosion is not morally responsible for the fact that the enemy base is crushed at T_3 . Above I offered Erosion as a counterexample to (B') and now I am claiming that given (B') one may show that Betty in Erosion is not morally responsible for her action. In all honesty, I find it difficult to decide which way to go at times. This is consistent with my main thesis: there is a tension between there being genuine Frankfurt-style examples and the transfer principles used in versions of the direct argument.

Principles (B₁) and (B₂) are similar to (B') in many respects. Both inference rules have their corresponding agent-relative versions and there is no substantive reason for accepting the former rules yet rejecting the latter. In Tax Evasion (2), ($C_1 \vee C_2$) entails A and the event described by A occurs later than that described by C_1 (and thus $C_1 \vee C_2$).¹³ The differences between (B'), (B₁), and (B₂) are irrelevant to my main thesis. (B₁) and (B₂) may both be used to show that crucial agents in genuine Frankfurt-style examples are not morally responsible for their actions. One cannot accept both SI-F and SI-D.

The above criticism applies to van Inwagen's principle (B), as well. Consider Tax Evasion (2) along with this agent relative version of (B):

(B**) From $N_S(p)$ and $N_S(p \supset q)$ deduce $N_S(q)$,

where ' $N_S(p)$ ' stands for ' S is not even partly responsible for the fact that p .' Joe is not even partly responsible for the fact that $C_1 \vee C_2$, for this fact is ensured by the intervener. Furthermore, ($C_1 \vee C_2$) entails A . From (A) it follows that $N((C_1 \vee C_2) \supset A)$. Therefore, $N_{Joe}((C_1 \vee C_2) \supset A)$. Given (B**), Joe is not even partly responsible for evading taxes.

5. McKenna's Transfer Principle

There is one more non-responsibility transfer principle worth considering. It was first offered by Michael McKenna (2001, 45) and discussed in more detail by Fischer (2004, 193–4). As a preliminary, note first the following principle:

NR*: From $NR(p)$ and $NR(\text{the fact that } p \text{ is causally sufficient for the fact that } q)$ deduce $NR(q)$.¹⁴

NR* is cast in terms of causal sufficiency, not entailment. I have my doubts that the concept of *causal sufficiency* can be understood independent of the concept of *entailment*. This is counter, for instance, to van Inwagen's definition of 'determinism,' noted above, and I have not seen a better definition. Regardless, one may use Erosion, together with insights gained from the last section of this paper, to provide a counterexample to NR*.

With Erosion in mind, let G be the proposition that the glacier is eroding and ice and rocks break free at t_2 , let B be the proposition that Betty plants explosives at t_1 , and let E be the proposition that the enemy base is crushed at t_3 . $G \vee B$ is true and no one is (now), or ever has been, morally responsible for the fact that the disjunction is true. Moreover, the fact that $G \vee B$ is causally sufficient for the fact that E. Yet Betty is morally responsible for the fact that E, so NR* is invalid.

Our last principle attempts to capture much of the intuitive force behind NR* while remaining resistant to single-agent Frankfurt-style examples like Erosion.

NR'': From (1) p and no one is (now), or ever has been, morally responsible for the fact that p , and (2) (i) the fact that p is part of the actual sequence of events e that gives rise to the fact that q , (ii) the fact that p is causally sufficient for the fact that q , and any other part of e that is causally sufficient for the fact that q either causes or is caused by the fact that p , and (iii) no one is (now), or ever has been, morally responsible for the fact that (2i) & (2ii) deduce (3) q and no one is (now), or ever has been, morally responsible for the fact that q (cf. Fischer 2004, 193–194; McKenna 2001, 45).

Erosion is not a counterexample to NR'', for the fact that B is causally sufficient for the fact that E yet the fact that B neither causes nor is caused by the fact that $G \vee B$. This is counter to clause (2ii) in NR''.¹⁵

Fischer calls principle NR'' a "one path modal principles" (2004, 198) since it is immune to examples of simultaneous overdetermination, like Erosion. Unfortunately, as Fischer notes, such principles cannot be used in a "general argument" for INC, for simultaneous overdetermination is just as possible in worlds where determinism is true as it is in worlds where determinism is not true. Fischer writes: "If there were a world—unusual as this would be—with all of the morally significant behavior occurring as a result of simultaneous overdetermination, then Transfer NR'' would be entirely consistent with moral responsibility coexisting peacefully with

causal determinism in this world” (2004, 195). Transfer NR” is of little help, then, to the direct source incompatibilist.

In reply, one might note that cases of simultaneous overdetermination are rare. Thus, one may still use NR” to show that determinism excludes moral responsibility in *most* cases.¹⁶ Yet if determinism is a threat to our moral responsibility, and if NR” is the transfer principle that is supposed to illustrate this threat, then it is a mystery why it cannot be used to show that no one is morally responsible for anything in deterministic worlds where casual over determination persists. Another plausible explanation for its failings is that NR” is an ad hoc principle, built entirely in response to the counterexamples and criticisms noted above.

6. Concluding Remarks

Frankfurt-style examples provide the impetus for at least one group of counterexamples to non-responsibility transfer principles and this demonstrates a minor conflict between SI-F and SI-D. Even if we suppose that SI-D is true, and that the direct argument is sound and independent of the traditional argument for INC, transfer principles used in the direct argument may also be used to show that crucial agents in Frankfurt-style examples are not morally responsible for their actions. This, in turn, compromises the source incompatibilist’s reasons for endorsing SI-F. One path modal principles, like Transfer NR”, are immune to the criticisms noted in this paper but they are too weak to be used in a general argument for INC. Direct source incompatibilism is inherently unstable and we should bid it a fond farewell!

Notes

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1. For a related discussion of moral responsibility, see Fischer and Ravizza 1993. According to Fischer (1982 and 1994), free will requires alternative possibilities of action. I consider this to be a terminological dispute between us. Substitute ‘freedom’ for ‘free will’ and Fischer should accept all of the claims in this paragraph.
 2. For instance, McKenna writes: “Source incompatibilists hold that determinism *does* rule out free will. But it does so, not because it rules out alternative possibilities, but instead, because, if true, the sources of an agent’s actions do not originate *in* the agent but are traceable to factors outside her” (2003, 201–3).

3. Fischer (1982, 183ff.) is the first to acknowledge the possibility of source incompatibilism, though he is a source or semi-compatibilist. Genuine proponents of source incompatibilism include Stump (1990, 1996, 1999, and 2003), Zagzebski (1991, 154–162, and 2000), and Pereboom (2003). Stump is also a direct source incompatibilist and Pereboom has argued for a modest version of the view in correspondence.
4. This particular formulation of the argument is due to Widerker.
5. A libertarian is an incompatibilist who accepts the free will thesis.
6. Fischer (1999, 100–101) and Allen (1999) provide interesting responses to the first horn of the WKG dilemma.
7. Tax Evasion (2) is a slightly altered version of Tax Evasion (Pereboom 2000, 119), changed to “enhance the example’s psychological realism” (Pereboom 2003, 198, fn. 20). Another convincing Frankfurt-style example is Stump’s (G) (1996, 76–77, 2003, 140).
8. I’ve switched from talk about actions to talk about propositions. Here is one way to think of it. Our primary influence in the world is through our actions and their consequences. Some consequences take the form of other events: S does a and a causes event e . Since actions and events may be regarded as the truth-makers for some propositions, we may extend our influence to propositions (van Inwagen 1983; Perry 2004). For instance, if a is up to S , then by doing a S makes it the case that S does a . If a is up to S and a causes e , then by bringing about e S makes it the case that S brings about e .
9. Widerker’s best altered chronology example is Fate.

Suppose that Jones murders Smith at T_0 for some selfish reason, and that later on he murders another person, Green, at T_3 . Suppose also that the second murder is made possible by the first murder. That is, in the circumstances, the second murder requires the first murder as a causally necessary condition. Finally, suppose that Jones could have avoided murdering both Smith and Green, and believed that he could have avoided to so act (2002, 319).

10. Hudson shared this example with me in correspondence.
11. Given debates in action theory, it is difficult to specify these conditions more precisely. For the sake of brevity, I assume the truth of causalism, where causalism is the view that “an event’s being an action depends upon how it is caused” and actions are causally explained in terms of “such psychological or mental items as beliefs, desires, intentions, and related events” (Mele 1997, 2–3). I contend that a similar set of conditions may be offered that would satisfy non-causal theories of action, as well, but I do not discuss the matter here. I thank Widerker for noting this point. I also thank McKenna and Timpe for comments that led to a revision of (1) as well as the main argument in this section.
Also, I assume that in any genuine Frankfurt-style example there are only two possible causal chains: c_1 and c_2 . Really, there are only two *types* of causal chains. For instance, the counterfactual causal chain could develop in any of a number of different ways. This simplifying assumption is irrelevant to my main argument.
12. The anonymous referee from this journal suggests that the intervener could ensure that $C_1 \vee C_2$ only by ensuring the true of C_2 . This cannot be correct. That the intervener ensures $C_1 \vee C_2$ is essential to any genuine Frankfurt-style example. If this is not the case, then there is no reason to suppose that the crucial agent could not have done otherwise. Yet in any genuine Frankfurt-style example C_2 is false, for it is the claim that the *counterfactual* causal chain is causally efficacious.
13. Since A is part of the content of both C_1 and C_2 , (B_2) may be a bit harder to refute. C_1 and C_2 need to be reworded. Let C_1 be the proposition that describes the occurrence of the first event in causal chain c_1 and let C_2 be the proposition that describes the occurrence of the first event in causal chain c_2 .

14. Pereboom suggested this principle in correspondence.
15. I thank Carroll for pointing this out.
16. The anonymous referee from this journal raised this point.

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