

# *Seminar in International Security*

## Political Science 531

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**Instructor: Dr. Thomas Preston**

**Fall Semester 2014**

**Office: 810 Johnson Tower**

**Office Hours: Tuesday/Thursday 11am-12pm**

**Or by appointment (335-5225 or tpreston@wsu.edu)**

**Class Time: Monday 2:10-5:00p.m.; COLL235**

### **Course Description and Objectives**

This seminar is designed to provide graduate students with a solid foundation in modern, post-Cold War security studies. The first section of the course will focus upon an in-depth review of the traditional security studies literature, covering topics such as: the nature of war and its conduct, "just war" and ethical standards, and various theories regarding the use of force, nuclear proliferation, and both conventional and nuclear deterrence. Both classical and contemporary works will be examined to provide students with an appropriate historical and theoretical background in international security. In addition, the course will focus attention on issues such as nuclear and biological terrorism, potential policy responses, and issues of crisis management. This course should provide an overview useful for those interested in academic careers and specializations in security studies, as well as for those with interests in pursuing careers in the practitioner community.

### **Course Requirements**

Since there is only one graduate-level security studies course offered in our program, it is necessary to cover the extensive security literature in only one semester. As a result, this seminar has been carefully designed to provide students with a comprehensive overview of the most important debates and literature in modern security studies. Unfortunately, this requires an extensive reading load for the seminar in order to accomplish your security studies training. Taking this into account, **this seminar places a substantial amount (25%) of the final grade on the active participation and demonstration by students during seminar discussions that they have read the assigned course materials** (See the table below which illustrates how student participation is evaluated). Although challenging, it is only through such extensive coverage of the security literature that you will attain the competency required to develop a specialization in the field and be able to successfully market yourself as qualified to do either research or teaching in this area.

**It is expected that students regularly attend seminar sessions, read the assigned weekly materials in advance, and actively participate in class discussions. In addition, each week, two students will be responsible for leading class discussions on the assigned readings.** If there is a particular section you would be interested in focusing upon, please sign up for the discussant role for that week in advance with the instructor. There will be no exams or research papers in this course. However, **students are required to write three 15 page literature critiques during the semester** (75% of grade). These may be selected from ANY set of weekly readings the student chooses (from Weeks 2-14). **Critiques are due in class on October 13th; November 10th; and December 8th.** These critiques should include: (1)discussion of the overarching themes of the pieces (i.e., how do they fit together?); (2)what you see as the strengths of the pieces (i.e., their theoretical value, validity, applicability to the real world, etc.); (3)what you see as the weaknesses of the pieces; and (4)how or in what areas you believe the research could be improved (be specific). A detailed outline for the literature

critiques is included at the back of this syllabus. Given the heavy reading load, it is strongly recommended that students read ahead whenever possible. **Late papers are heavily penalized (5% per day late beyond the deadline) and are not accepted at all if more than five days late.** Of course, if you have extenuating circumstances (such as a prolonged illness or other personal problem), extensions may be granted, but only at the instructor's discretion. Extensions will not be given for those who put off writing their papers until close to the deadline and run out of time. Schedule your time well and work ahead so that you do not find yourself in a bind. If you are unsure of your critiques, the instructor is available during office hours to discuss drafts of papers with students before they are handed in for a final grade.

**The final grade will be comprised of the following components:**

<i>Three Critiques of Weekly Readings</i> (Each 15 pages in length/worth 25% each)	75%
<i>Active Seminar Participation</i> (i.e., leading of seminar discussions; demonstration by student during seminar discussions that they have done assigned readings each week)	<u>25%</u>
<i>Total</i>	100%

**Seminar Participation Grading Index** - (used to evaluate student participation during each class session throughout the semester).

<i>Grade</i>	<i>Student Performance in Seminar Session</i>
A	Active participation in seminar discussions PLUS substantial demonstration of having read the readings PLUS substantive demonstration of theoretical and/or critical thinking regarding the readings.
A-	Active participation in seminar discussions PLUS demonstration of having read and understood the readings.
B+	Limited participation in seminar discussions PLUS limited demonstration of having read and understood the readings.
B	Limited participation in seminar discussions PLUS no effective demonstration of having read or understood the readings.
C	No participation that session.

### **Required Texts & Readings**

**This seminar requires six books, listed below, which are available at the university bookstore.** Very cheap paperbacks of Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz should be readily available. In fact, if you act fast, **you may find very cheap, used paperback copies of all of these books on amazon.com.**

- (1) Thucydides. *The History of the Peloponnesian War.*
- (2) Sun Tzu. *The Art of War.*

- (3) **Karl von Clausewitz. *On War*.**
- (4) **Thomas Preston. *From Lambs to Lions: Future Security Relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons*. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009. (ISBN: 978-0-7425-5503-7)**
- (5) **James G. Blight. *The Shattered Crystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992. (ISBN: 0-8226-3015-X)**
- (6) **Paul Christopher. *The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues*. Second Edition. Prentice Hall, Inc. 1994. (ISBN: 0-13-786278-4)**

**Readings denoted by an (\*) next to the citation in your list of weekly readings in the syllabis are available online at the WSU Angel website (<https://lms.wsu.edu/>),** which you can access as students by clicking onto the course. There are also optional, "suggested" readings listed for some weeks on your syllabis. You are NOT responsible for these in either seminar discussions or literature reviews. I have provided these optional readings purely in the spirit of providing those students interested in a particular topic additional materials of relevance.

### **Code of Conduct**

The University Student Handbook states that students have the right to freedom of expression but that disruptive behavior in classes will not be permitted. You are expected to participate in classroom activities in a professional manner. Private discussions with other students, passing notes, reading newspapers, disruptive eating, sleeping, or persistently arriving late or leaving early constitute inappropriate classroom behavior. If you demonstrate such behavior, you will be verbally warned in class to cease. If you persist in disruptive or distracting behavior, formal action, in accordance with WSU policy, will be taken. Expectations for student assignments and participation are set by the course syllabus and are not negotiable. Students who decline to fulfill those expectations should select another course.

### **Statement of Disability Policy**

Students with Disabilities: Reasonable accommodations are available for students with a documented disability. If you have a disability and need accommodations to fully participate in this class, please either visit or call the Access Center (Washington Building 217; 509-335-3417) to schedule an appointment with an Access Advisor. All accommodations MUST be approved through the Access Center.

### **Academic Dishonesty: WAC 504-25-015 and WAC 504-25-315**

Academic integrity will be strongly enforced in this course. Any student caught cheating on any assignment will be given an F grade for the course and will be reported to the Office Student Standards and Accountability. I encourage you to work with classmates on assignments. However the guiding principle of academic integrity shall be that your submitted work, examinations, reports, and projects must be your own work. No copying will be accepted. Students who violate WSU's Standards of Conduct for Students will receive an F as a final grade in this course, will not have the option to withdraw from the course and will be reported to the Office Student Standards and Accountability. Cheating is defined in the Standards for Student Conduct WAC 504-26-010 (3). It is strongly suggested that you read and understand these definitions. You can learn more about Academic Integrity on your campus using the URL listed in the Academic Regulations section or to <http://conduct.wsu.edu/academic-integrity-policies-and-resources>. Please use these resources to ensure that you don't inadvertently violate WSU's standard of conduct. “

### **Safety and Emergency Notifications**

Washington State University is committed to enhancing the safety of the students, faculty, staff, and visitors. It is highly recommended that you review the Campus Safety Plan (<http://safetyplan.wsu.edu/>) and visit the Office of Emergency Management web site (<http://oem.wsu.edu/>) for a comprehensive listing of university policies, procedures, statistics, and information related to campus safety, emergency management, and the health and welfare of the campus community.”

## **Guide to Writing PolSci 531 Critiques of the Security Literature**

In this seminar, you will be required to write THREE critiques of the weekly course readings (15 pages in length each). The purpose of these writing assignments are four-fold: **1) to help you to develop the skills you will need to complete your dissertations/theses and be successful in the political science profession** (i.e., to improve your understanding of the theoretical literature; to improve your ability to synthesize, compare, and contrast the arguments/findings in the literature; to develop the ability to both positively and negatively critique articles/theories, etc.); **2) to prepare you for your preliminary examinations** (the better your reviews/critiques of the literature, the less work you will have to do to get ready for your exams); **3) to improve your understanding of theory-building and methodology** (i.e., by seeing how research is designed in the articles in this course and by critically evaluating these efforts, students will gain a better understanding of how to go about their own research on dissertations, theses, conference papers, or articles); and **4) to encourage active participation in weekly seminars and maximize your immediate learning of the material in this course** (if you have had to think about the readings for your paper, you are likely to get more out of the seminar discussions and be able to explore areas brought up in the readings you are curious/unsure about).

You will find that these critiques will make your revision for your prelims go much smoother because you will have put the time and thought into the material when you had the time (and lack of stress) to do the job well! I do not exaggerate when I say that you may be saving yourselves weeks of work later by putting in some effort now. Also, you may find these critiques useful for your dissertation/theses literature reviews or possibly for writing lectures for a graduate/undergraduate seminar in security in your first teaching job somewhere. Bottom-line: although it requires some work now, you will reap far greater benefits later down the road by taking these papers seriously and really putting some effort into them.

# *The Basic Elements You Should Include in Your Literature Critiques:*

**I.) What are the main argument(s)/finding(s) made by the author(s) in each article?**

- briefly and coherently summarize the main findings/arguments/assumptions in the articles.

**II.) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the argument(s) made by the author(s)?**

*strengths*

- addresses gap in literature/deals with interesting problem well (adds to our understanding of the topic and our efforts to build theory)
- creative/well-thought out methodology or research design.
- policy-relevant applications or theory-relevant findings.

*weaknesses*

- logical problems (inconsistent argument, tautologies, etc.)
- methodological problems (measurement, operationalization, choice of cases, validity, etc.)
- relevancy/validity problems (asks wrong question or one which doesn't really get at the real nature of the problem, use of faulty or unrealistic assumptions, etc.)

**III.) Are there any overarching themes which can be discerned across the articles?**

- if all the articles were on deterrence theory - where do they agree/disagree with each other, what common problems/questions do they all address, did they share similar theoretical assumptions, etc.

**IV.) Where do we go from here? - (critical thinking)**

- Do we know more (or less) about the subject as a result of these articles? Are you persuaded more by the arguments/findings of one author or another? Why?
- How could the research be improved upon (theoretically, methodologically, relevancy-wise, etc.)
- Present any ideas you might have regarding how you would look at the problem/question.

*The better you address these FOUR SECTIONS in your critiques, the better your grade.*

# *Seminar in Post-Cold War International Security*

## **I. A New Conception of National Security?**

**Week 1 (8/25): Introduction to Post-Cold War Security Studies and Course Overview.**

**Required Readings:**

None

**(No Class - Labor Day 9/1)**

**Week 3 (9/8): What is National Security & How Do We Know It When We See It?: Defining our concepts and moving to theory-building in security studies.**

**Required Readings:**

- \*Brody, Bernard (1973). "Vital Interests: What are They and Who Says So?" In B. Brodie, *War & Politics*, Chapter 8, pp.341-374.
- \*Nye, Jr., Joseph S. (1999). "Redefining the National Interest." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, No.4 (July/August), pp.22-35.
- \*Nye, Jr., Joseph S. "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No.4 (July/August 2009): 160-163.
- \*Krause, Keith and Williams, Michael C. (1996). "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods." *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol.40, pp.229-254.
- \*Walt, Stephen M. (1991). "The Renaissance of Security Studies." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.35, pp.211-239.
- \*Walt, Stephen M. (1999). "Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and Security Studies." *International Security*, Vol.23, No.4 (Spring), pp.5-48.
- \*Lantis, Jeffrey S. (2002). "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy." *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No.3 (Fall): 87-113.
- \*Bilgin, Pinar. (2003). "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security." *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No.2 (June): 203-222.

**Suggested Optional Readings:**

- Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
- Haftendorn, Helga (1991). "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.35, pp.3-17.
- Levy, Marc A. (1995). "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" *International Security* 20, 2: 35-62.
- Zelikow, Philip (1994). "Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again." *International Security*, Vol.18, No.4, pp.143-171.
- Special Roundtable (2006). "Bridging the Gap Between the Academic and Policy Worlds." *Asia Policy* (January): 2-41.

## **II. The Causes & Nature of War -**

**Week 4 (9/15): Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz: Classical explanations of the origins of international conflict and the nature of war.**

### **Required Readings:**

Thucydides. *The History of the Peloponnesian War*. (all)

Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. (all)

Clausewitz, Karl von (1832). *On War*. Read Book One "On the Nature of War": Chapters 1, 2, 6, and 7, pp.101-138; 162-167. Also, Book Five "Plan of War": Chapters 1-6, pp.365-410.

\*Bond, Brian (1998). *The Pursuit of Victory from Napoleon to Saddam Hussein*. New York: Oxford University Press: "Introduction" (pp.1-11); "Napoleon and the Decisive Battle" (pp.28-43); "The Napoleonic Legacy: The Influence of Jomini and Clausewitz" (pp.44-57).

### **Suggested Optional Readings:**

Machiavelli. *The Prince*. (all)

Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948). "A Realist Theory of International Politics." In H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th Edition, Chapter 1, pp.3-27.

**Week 5 (9/22): Debate Over Morality and Just/Unjust War.**

### **Required Readings:**

Christopher, Paul (1994). *The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues*. Second Edition. Prentice Hall, Inc. (all).

\*Downes, Alexander B. (2006). "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War." *International Security*, Vol. 30, No.4 (Spring), pp.152-195.

\*All of the following from Wakin, Malham M. (ed.), (1979). *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press:

Taylor, Telford. "War Crimes," (pp.415-430); "Superior Orders and Reprisals," (pp.431-442); "Just and Unjust Wars," (pp.245-258); Krickus, Richard J. "On the Morality of Chemical/Biological War," (pp.487-503); Wheeler, Michael O. "Loyalty, Honor, and the Modern Military," (pp.179-188); Wakin, Malham M. "The Ethics of Leadership," (pp.197-217); Struckmeyer, Frederick R. "The 'Just War' and the Right of Self-Defense," (pp.273-284).

\*Grayling, A.C. (2006). *Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in Germany and Japan*. New York: Walker & Company, pp.209-281.

\*Mueller, John and Karl Mueller (1999). "Sanctions of Mass Destruction." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, No.3 (May/June), pp.43-53.

\*Luttwak, Edward N. (1999). "Give War a Chance." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, No.4 (July/August), pp.36-44.

### **Suggested Optional Readings:**

Walzer, Michael (1977). *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations*. Second Edition. Basic Books, HarperCollins Publishers.

### **III. The Evolution of Deterrence Theory & Nuclear Strategy During the Cold War**

#### **Week 6 (9/29): The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence Theory, the Utility of Nuclear Weapons, and the Debate Surrounding the ‘Nuclear Peace’.**

##### **Required Readings:**

- \*All of the following from Art & Waltz (1993), *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics* (4th edition):
  - "The Four Functions of Force," Art, (pp.3-11); "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," Waltz, (pp.333-349); "Deterrence and Defense," Snyder, (pp.350-368).
- \*Jervis, Robert (1976). "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary." In R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Chapter 3, pp.58-113.
- \*Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). "The Diplomacy of Violence." In Art and Waltz, *The Use of Force*, (3rd edition), pp.3-24.
- \*Bundy, McGeorge (1982). "Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences." In D. MacLean (ed.), *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age*, pp.3-13.
- \*Zanvyl Krieger and Ariel Ilan Roth (2007). "Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory." *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Fall): 369-384.
- \*Kristensen, Hans M. (2002). "Preemptive Posturing: What Happened to Deterrence?" *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 58, no.5 (September/October), pp. 54-59.
- \*Powell, Robert (2003). "Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense." *International Security* 27, no.4 (Spring), pp. 86-118.
- \*All of the following from Gjelstad, Jorn and Njolstad, Olav (eds.) (1996). *Nuclear Rivalry and International Order*. London: Sage Publications:
  - "Mutual Assured Disagreement, or discussing the Nuclear Peace Thesis," Njolstad, (pp.1-14);
  - "The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on History," Schlesinger, (pp.15-21); "The Nuclear Revolution into its Second Phase," Van Den Bergh (pp.22-39); "Nuclear Weapons and Cold War History," Gaddis, (pp.40-54), "Nine Propositions about the Historical Impact of Nuclear Weapons," Mueller, (pp.55-74); "Controlling the Soviet-U.S. Enduring Rivalry: What was the Role of Nuclear Weapons?," Russett, (pp.75-84).

##### **Suggested Optional Readings:**

- Powell, Robert (1990). *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility*. NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Freedman, Lawrence (1981). *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd.
- Brodie, Bernard (1966). *Escalation and the Nuclear Option*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Gallois, Pierre (1961). *The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Rhodes, Edward (1989). *Power and MADness: The Logic of Nuclear Coercion*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

## **Week 7 (10/6): The Debate Over Deterrence Success/Failure: Huth & Russett versus Lebow & Stein; Psychological Perspectives; and Recent Research.**

### **Required Readings:**

- \*Harvey, Frank P. (1997). "Deterrence and Compellence in Protracted Crises: Methodology and Preliminary Findings." *International Studies Notes*, Vol.22, pp.12-23.
- \*Harvey, Frank P. (1997). "Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions," pp.3-18; "Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing," pp.19-46; "New Directions for Aggregate Testing," pp.47-55; "Nuclear Stability After the Cold War," pp.112-120. *The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability After the Cold War*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- \*Harvey, Frank P. (1998). "Rigor Mortis, or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.42, No.4, pp.675-707.
- \*Huth, Paul and Russett, Bruce (1990). "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference." *World Politics*, Vol.42, pp.466-501.
- \*Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice Gross (1989). "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter." *World Politics*, Vol.41, pp.208-224.
- \*Johnson, Dominic and Tierney, Dominic. (2011). "The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return." *International Security*, Vol. 36, No.1 (Summer): 7-40.
- \*Tetlock, Philip E., McGuire, Charles B., and Mitchell, Gregory (1991). "Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence." *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol.42, pp.239-276.

### **Suggested Optional Readings:**

- Herring, Eric (1995) "Deterrence and Compellence." In E. Herring, *Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes*, Chapter 1, pp.1-36.

## **Week 8 (10/13): Conventional Deterrence and the "Limited" Use of Force in Post-Cold War Security Thinking.**

### **Required Readings:**

- \*Mearsheimer, John J. (1983). *Conventional Deterrence*, Chapters 1-5 and 7-8, pp.13-164; 189-212.
- \*Harknett, Richard J. (1994). "The Logic of Conventional Deterrence and the End of the Cold War." *Security Studies*, Vol.4, No.1, pp.86-114.
- \*Scales, Jr., Maj. Gen. Robert H. (1999). "Adaptive Enemies: Dealing with the Strategic Threat After 2010." *Strategic Review*, Vol.27, No.1 (Winter), pp.5-14.
- \*Saunders, Elizabeth N. (2009). "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy." *International Security*, Vol. 34, No.2 (Fall): 119-161.
- \*Byman, Daniel A. and Waxman, Matthew C. (2000). "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate." *International Security*, Vol.24, No.4 (Spring), pp.5-38.
- Lake, Daniel R. (2009). "The Limits of Coercive Airpower: NATO's 'Victory' in Kosovo Revisited." *International Security*, Vol. 34, No.1 (Summer), pp.83-112.
- \*H.R. McMaster (2008). "On War: Lessons to be Learned." *Survival*, Vol. 50, No.1 (February/March): 19-30.

### **Suggested Optional Readings:**

- Cohen, Eliot A. (1994). "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.73, No.1, pp.103-124.
- Hass, Richard N. (1999). *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*. Revised Edition. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Johnson, David E., Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft (2002). *Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

O'Hanlon, Michael. (2000). "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan." *International Security*, Vol.25, No.2 (Fall), pp.51-86.

O'Hanlon, Michael (1998). "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks." *International Security*, Vol.22, No.4 (Spring), pp.135-170.

## **Week 9 (10/20): Offense-Defense (Security Dilemma) Theory and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).**

### **Required Readings:**

\*Jervis, Robert (1976). "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." In R. Art and K. Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics* (4th edition), pp.35-65.

\*Van Evera, Stephen (1998). "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War." *International Security*, Vol.22, No.4 (Spring), pp.5-43.

\*Glaser, Charles L. and Kaufmann, Chaim (1998). "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" *International Security*, Vol.22, No.4 (Spring), pp.44-82.

\*Adams, Karen Ruth (2003/2004). "Attack and Conquer?: International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance." *International Security* 28, no.3, pp. 45-83.

\*Biddle, Stephen (1998). "The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare." *Security Studies*, Vol.8, No.1 (Autumn), pp.1-74.

\*Betz, David J. (2006). "The More You Know, The Less You Understand: The Problem With Information Warfare." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 29, No.3 (June), pp.505-533.

\*Loo, Bernard Fook Weng (2009). "Decisive Battle, Victory, and the Revolution in Military Affairs." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 32, No.2 (April), pp.189-211.

\*Renner, Major R.A. (2004). "America's Asymmetric Advantage: The Utility of Airpower in the New Strategic Environment." *Defence Studies* Vol. 4, No.1 (Spring): 87-113.

\*Biddle, Stephen (2007). "Speed Kills?: Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situational Awareness in the Fall of Saddam." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 30, No.1 (February), pp.3-46.

### **Suggested Optional Readings:**

Symposium on the Gulf War and the Revolution in Military Affairs, *International Security*, Vol.22, No.2 (Fall 1997):

Press, Daryl G., "Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and Technology," pp.137-146; Keaney, Thomas A., "The Linkage of Air and Ground Power in the Future of Conflict," pp.147-150; Mahnken, Thomas G. and Watts, Barry D., "What the Gulf War Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about the Future of Warfare," pp.151-162; Biddle, Stephen, "The Gulf War Debate Redux: Why Skill and Technology Are the Right Answer," pp.163-174.

Cohen, Eliot A. (1996). "A Revolution in Warfare." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.75, No.2 (March/April): 37-54.

Roundtable Review on Military Power and the RMA. (2005). *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 28, No.3 (June): 413-469.

O'Hanlon, Michael. (2000). *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

## **IV. Nuclear Proliferation and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs): A Challenge to Deterrence & Realism?**

### **Week 10 (10/27): The Nuclear Proliferation "Control School": Efforts to Prevent the Spread of WMDs through Control Regimes and Other Methods.**

#### **Required Readings:**

- \*Sagan, Scott D. (1997). "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb." *International Security*, Vol.21, No.3, pp.54-86.
- \*Feaver, Peter D. and Niou, Emerson M.S. (1996). "Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.40, No.2, pp.209-234.
- \*Dunn, Lewis, in Art & Waltz (1993), *The Use of Force: "What Difference Will It Make?,"* pp.514-526;
- \*Feaver, Peter D. (1992/93). "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations." *International Security*, Vol.17, No.3 (Winter), pp.160-187.
- \*Sagan, Scott D. (1994). "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." *International Security*, Vol.18, No.4, pp.66-107.
- \*Fuhrmann, Matthew (2009). "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements." *International Security*, Vol. 34, No.1 (Summer), pp.7-41.
- \*Zelikow, Philip (1993). "Offensive Military Options." In R.D. Blackwill and A. Carnesale (eds.), *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy*, pp.162-195.
- \*Glaser, Charles L. and Steve Fetter. (2005) "Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions." *International Security* Vol. 30, No.2 (Fall): 84-126.
- \*Corr, Anders (2005) "Deterrence of Nuclear Terror: A Negligence Doctrine." *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 12, No.1 (March): 127-147.

### **Week 11 (11/3): The Debate Over Nuclear Proliferation and the Character of Its Threat to Existing State Security Relationships.**

#### **Required Readings:**

- Thomas Preston. (2009). *From Lambs to Lions: Future Security Relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons*. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007, chpts 1-3, pp.1-180.
- \*Waltz, Kenneth, "Toward Nuclear Peace," pp.527-555 in Art & Waltz (1993), *The Use of Force*.
- \*Gavin, Francis J. (2009/2010). "Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War." *International Security*, Vol. 34, No.3 (Winter), pp.7-37.
- \*Lieber, Keir A. and Press, Daryl G. (2013). "Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists," *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Summer): 80-104.
- \*Cohen, Michael D. (2013). "How Nuclear South Asia is Like Cold War Europe: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited," *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 20, No.3, pp.433-451.
- \*Karl, David J. (1997). "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers." *International Security*, Vol.21, No.3, pp.87-119.
- \*Feaver, Peter D., Sagan, Scott D., and Karl, David J. (1997): "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers." *International Security*, Vol.22, No.2 (Fall), pp.185-207.
- \*Rehbein, Robert E. (2002). "Managing Proliferation in South Asia: A Case for Assistance to Unsafe Nuclear Arsenals." *The Nonproliferation Review*. (Spring) Vol.9, No.1, pp.92-111.

\*Hagerty, Devin T. (1998). "Debating the Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," pp.9-38; "Opaque Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and Nuclear Weapon Stability," pp.39-62. *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

**Suggested Optional Readings:**

Cirincione, Joseph (2002). *Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. *Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993.

Goldstein, Avery. (2000). *Deterrence and Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Steinberg, Gerald M. (2000). "Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle East: Lessons from the 1991 Gulf War." *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall/Winter), pp.43-60.

**Weeks 12(11/10): Nuclear Primacy and Debates Over Managing Existing Nuclear Arsenals: The Case of the Indian-Pakistani Nuclear Relationship.**

**Required Readings:**

\*Lieber, Keir A. and Press, Daryl G. (2006). "The End of Mad?: The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy." *International Security* Vol. 30, No.4 (Spring), pp.7-44.

\*Sokov, Nilolai (2007). "Second Thoughts About a First Strike." *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 14, No.1 (March): 139-147.

\*Reiter, Dan. (2005). "Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the 'Success' At Osiraq." *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 12, No.2 (July): 355-371.

\*Braut-Hegghammer, Malfrid. (2011). "Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks." *International Security*, Vol. 36, No.1 (Summer): 101-132.

\*Lieber, Keir A. and Press, Daryl G. (2009). "The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent." *Foreign Affairs* Vol.88, No.6 (November/December), pp.39-51.

\*Sauer, Tom. (2009). "A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 32, No.5 (October), pp.745-767.

\*All of the following in Mazaar, Michael J. (ed.) (1997). *Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World: The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals* (New York: St. Martin's Press):

Mazaar, M., "The Notion of Virtual Arsenals," pp.3-29; Kim, T., "China and Virtual Nuclear Arsenals: Balancing Their Potential Risks and Benefits," pp.207-217; Hagerty, D., "Virtual Nuclear Deterrence and the Opaque Proliferants," pp.239-261; Waltz, K., "Thoughts on Virtual Nuclear Arsenals," pp.308-318; Mazaar, M., "Virtual Nuclear Arsenals: A Second Look," pp.369-392.

**The Indian-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship**

\*Hagerty, Devin T. (1995/96). "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis." *International Security*, Vol.20, No.3, pp.79-115.

\*Ganguly, Sumit (2008). "Nuclear Stability in South Asia." *International Security*, Vol. 33, No.2 (Fall), pp.45-70.

\*Kapur, S. Paul (2008). "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia." *International Security*, Vol. 33, No.2 (Fall), pp.71-94.

\*Narang, Vipin (2009/2010). "Posturing for Peace?: Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability." *International Security*, Vol. 34, No.3 (Winter), pp.38-78.

\*Carranza, Mario E. (1999). "An Impossible Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence After the Indian and Pakistani Tests." *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol.6, No.3 (Spring-Summer), pp.11-24.

\*Waltz, Kenneth N. (2004). "Nuclear Stability in South Asia." In R. Art and K. Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Sixth Edition, pp.382-393.

**Week 13 (11/17): Biological Weapons Proliferation and Security: Overview of research on deterrence & security relating to bio-warfare and bio-terrorism.**

**Required Readings:**

- \*Thomas Preston. (2009). *From Lambs to Lions: Future Security Relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons*. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, chpts 4-6, pp.181-368.
- \*Koblentz, Gregory D. (2010). "Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses." *International Security*, Vol.34, No.4 (Spring), pp.96-132.
- \*Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia Ben (2012). "Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation." *International Security*, Vol. 36, No.4 (Spring): 80-114.
- \*Kosal, Margaret E. (2009). "Potential Malfeasant Cooption of Nanotechnology," *Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense*, New York: Springer, pp., 89-101.
- \*Vogel, Kathleen M. (2013/14). "Expert Knowledge in Intelligence Assessments: Bird Flu and Bioterrorism," *International Security*, Vol. 38, No.3, pp.39-71.
- \*Sagan, Scott D. (2000). "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attack." *International Security*, Vol.24, 4, (Spring): 85-115.
- \*Utgoff, Victor A. (1997). *Nuclear Weapons and the Deterrence of Biological and Chemical Warfare*. Occasional Paper No. 36, October, The Henry L. Stimson Center, pp.1-31.

**Suggested Optional Readings:**

- Alibek, Ken (with Stephen Handelman) (1999). Biohazard. New York: Random House, pp.3-28; 70-86; 107-133; 153-167; 257-292.*
- U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. *Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993.
- Cohen, Avner. (2001). "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control." *The Nonproliferation Review*. (Fall/Winter) Vol.8, No.3, pp.27-53.
- Smithson, Amy E. and Leslie-Anne Levy. *Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the U.S. Response*. The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No.35, October 2000.
- Tucker, Jonathan B. and Amy Sands. (1999) "An Unlikely Threat." *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 55, No. 4, July/August.

***THANKSGIVING BREAK (11/24-11/28) - (No Classes)***

## **Week 14 (12/1): Terrorism and the Challenge to Security Thinking.**

### **Required Readings:**

- \*Jerrold Post (2004). *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World*. "The Mind of the Terrorist," (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press):123-161.
- \*Marc Sageman (2008). "The Next Generation of Terror." *Foreign Policy* (March/April): 37-42.
- \*Bruce Hoffman (2008). "The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.87, No.3, (May/June): 133-138.
- \*Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones (2008). "Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Dangerous Than Many Think." *International Security*, Vol. 33, No.2 (Fall), pp.7-44.
- \*Jonathan Renshon (2006). *Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention*. (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International), Chapters 6-7: 107-166.
- \*Philip H. Gordon (2007). "Can the War on Terror Be Won?: How to Fight the Right War." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.86, No.6 (November/December): 53-66.
- \*Jeffrey Record (2005). "The Limits and Temptations of America's Conventional Military Primacy." *Survival*, Vol. 47, No.1 (Spring): 33-50.
- \*Mark Bowden (2007). "How to Break a Terrorist." *The Atlantic Monthly* (May).

### **Optional Suggested Readings (not required):**

- Bruce Hoffman (1998). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jessica Stern (2003). *Terror in the Name of God*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
- Bruce Hoffman (2003). "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *The Atlantic Monthly* (June).
- Bruce Hoffman (2001). "Terrorism's CEO: An Interview with Peter Bergen." *The Atlantic Monthly* (January).
- Bruce Hoffman (2002). "A Nasty Business." *The Atlantic Monthly* (January).
- Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer. (1998). *America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

## **V. The Perils of Crisis Management -**

**Week 15 (12/8): The Challenge of Crisis Management - Stress and Misperception, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 9/11, and the Outbreak of World War I.**

### **Required Readings:**

- Blight, James G. (1992). *The Shattered Crystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (all)
- \*Post, Jerald. (1991). "The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers." In Alexander L. George, (ed.), *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, pp.471-494.
- \*Renshon, Jonathan (2009). "Assessing Capabilities in International Politics: Biased Overestimation and the Case of the Imaginary 'Missile Gap'." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 32, No.1 (February), pp.115-147.
- \*Parker, Charles F. and Stern, Eric K. (2005). "Bolt From the Blue or Avoidable Failure?: Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 1, No.3 (November): 301-327.
- \*Duelfer, Charles A. and Dyson, Stephen Benedict. (2011). "Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq Experience." *International Security*, Vo.36, No.1 (Summer): 73-100.
- \*All of the following from Tuchman, Barbara W. (1962). *The Guns of August*. New York: The Macmillan Company:
- "Let the Last Man on the Right Brush the Channel with His Sleeve," pp.17-27; "The Shadow of Sedan," pp.28-43; "Outbreak," pp.71-72; "August 1: Berlin," pp.73-83; "August 1: Paris and London," pp.84-97; "Ultimatum in Brussels," pp.98-111; "Home Before the Leaves Fall," pp.112-133.
- \*Keegan, John. *The First World War*. New York: Vintage Books, 1998: "War Plans," pp.24-47; "The Crisis of 1914," pp.48-70.
- \*Levy, Jack. (1991). "The Role of Crisis Management in the Outbreak of World War I." In Alexander L. George, (ed.), *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, pp.62-102.
- \*Van Evera, Stephen. (1993). "The Cult of the Offensive and World War I." In R. Art and K. Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Fourth edition, pp.121-147.
- \*Porch, Douglas (2006). "French War Plans, 1914: The 'Balance of Power Paradox'." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 29, No.1 (February), pp.117-144.

### **Optional Suggested Readings (not required):**

- George, Alexander L. "The Cuban Missile Crisis." In Alexander L. George, (ed.), *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, pp.222-268.
- Woods, Kevin M. and Stout, Mark E. (2010). "Saddam's Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of Desert Storm." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 33, No.1 (February), pp.5-41.